The journal Cliometrica sent me confirmation that they had accepted my paper on the economic consequences of the conquest of Quebec by the British in 1760. In the paper, I argued that the three main groups who advanced different positions regarding the effects of the conquest used the same lynchpin: engagement with markets. All groups (pessimists, minimalists, and optimists in my parlance) have mechanisms regarding the effects that assume that French-Canadians engaged to a different degree with markets after the Conquest. Optimists argued that they engaged more, minimalists argued that there were no changes and pessimists argued that there was a retreat into agrarianism.
As such, all three can be tested using trends in market integration over time and space. Greater market integration would rule out the minimalists and pessimists. As such, I conduct this test by using the price data I collected over the year. I find signs of strong market integration between 1760 and 1850 which is tied to modest economic growth. Consequently, I argue that we can rule out the idea that the Conquest was a bad. However, I point out that the evidence for arguing that the extent to which it was a benefit remains to be investigated. The abstract is below:
The British Conquest of Quebec in 1760 was a key moment in Canadian history as it marked the beginning of a tense coexistence between French and English Canadians. Many argue that the Conquest had strong economic consequences in the form of the relative poverty of the French settlers. The mechanisms proposed are manifold, but they all rely on a key feature: a retreat from the market by French farmers. Using 171 years of wheat price data for Quebec City and Montreal, I test whether there are any signs of this retreat from the market and instead find the opposite: over time, markets grew more integrated across regions. In fact, there are more signs of disintegration during the era of French rule. Additionally, over time, regional prices became better predicted by current prices elsewhere than by the lagged prices in the same region. By the 1830s, markets in Quebec were as well integrated as those in economies such as the United States, France, Britain and Germany. The evidence in this paper is consistent with recent empirical findings about Quebec’s economic history, and so I argue that the case for the Conquest’s initiation of the relative poverty of Quebec (also dubbed “economic inferiority” in the historiography) is non-existent. This does not exclude long-run consequences of the Conquest, but the correct answer must lie elsewhere than in conventional explanations.