A few days ago, I was informed that Rosolino Candela and myself were awarded the Gordon Tullock prize for best article published in Public Choice by junior scholars. The announcement is now public (see here). The award was granted for our article “The Lightship in Economics” (which can be consulted here).
The list of previous winners of the Gordon Tullock prize can be consulted here. I want to point out that, in recent years, many of the recipients have been interested in economic history. For example, Mark Koyama and Emily Skarbek shared the award for their respective works on private prosecutions in England during the 18th and 19th centuries and disaster relief efforts in Chicago following the Great Fire of 1871. Another example is that of Jayme Lemke on inter-jurisdictional competition and women’s rights at the dawn of the 20th century. I am happy to be in such great company economic-history wise.
I know I talk about lighthouses a lot. This is because they are economically relevant. They are the penultimate example of public goods and they underlie all positive (i.e. scientific) justifications for state-provision of public goods. However, economic theory has whitewashed the history of the lighthouse in order to make this case. In reality, the lighthouse never was a public good and it never was, before the 19th century, the main way of providing maritime safety. Alongside Rosolino Candela, in a new working paper, I provide a ton of historical evidence showing that it was a complement to private goods and services such as pilotage and ballastage. Because it was a complement to other goods, it could be privately provided through bundling. That option was prohibited, however, by rent-seeking and monopoly privileges granted to firms/guilds involved in the production of the private goods that could (and did) produce lighthouses and other such services. As such, Rosolino and me are arguing that economists were wrong to consider the lighthouse even as a public good. The abstract is below and the link to the SSRN paper (submitted for a special conference on the economics of James Buchanan) is here.
Was the lighthouse ever a public good? The lighthouse is presented as the quintessential public good as it was inherently non-excludable and non-rivalrous. Since the work of Ronald Coase (1974) on the lighthouse, economists have used debated the extent to which the private provision of public goods is possible. In this work, we highlight recent findings in the history of lighting services (especially private provision of said services) in order to argue that it may be incorrect to consider the lighthouse as a public good. First, we argue that lighthouses are probably better seen as a complement to other maritime services (e.g. pilotage, docking, ballastage). The lighthouse could have been bundled with these complements, which were excludable and rivalrous, in ways that would have permitted its provision. Second, we argue that organizations in charge of providing lighthouses were aware of this bundling possibility and lobbied hard to monopolize these other aspects of the trade in ways that limited entrepreneurial opportunities.
I have a new working paper available, this time co-authored with Frank Garmon and Phillip Magness. In this paper, we argue that rankings of presidential greatness in the United States (i.e. the evaluation of presidential performance) have systemic biases resulting from Presidents wanting to rank higher in such rankings. Because Presidents care about their historical reputations (i.e. how well they rank relative to other Presidents), they want to leave a mark that historians can observe. This means that there is a bias in favor of being proactive and that there is a penalty to being restrained. Presidential restraint means that there are fewer crumbs in the forest for historians to follow. However, there is no reason to believe that restraint is an inefficient (in terms of socio-economic outcomes) course of action. There are numerous instances where restraint could be warranted. Thus, restraint may be desirable socially but undesirable for an individual president as it means that he will not be seen as easily by historians. The abstract is below and the paper is available here on SSRN:
Comparative rankings of presidential performance can be clouded with partisan biases. Here, we argue that there is another and often overlooked bias: active presidents use power and in the process they highlight their performance. It is easier to observe the use of power than the restraint of power. As such, there is a form of selection bias in expert rankings of presidents whereby we are best able to evaluate those who are more proactive rather than those who, willfully or not, exercise political restraint. In this paper, we consider how presidential rankings of greatness are affected by measures of presidential restraint (use of veto powers, divided government, changes in the size of government). We find evidence that restraint has a negative effect on presidential rankings suggesting the presence of a bias historical evaluation whereby presidents that adopt proactive and interventionist policy stances leave more visible marks that impress more favorably upon expert rankings of presidents.
I have a new working paper, co-authored with Kevin Grier. In the paper, we consider the consequences of the election of Quebec’s first separatist government in 1976. This is a paper that should have been written years ago given how often the topic is discussed in Canadian politics. The paper can be consulted here on SSRN and the abstract is below:
Most separatist movements overlap with ethnic tensions and are associated with violent and economically destructive outcomes. In this paper, we consider a (largely) peaceful separatist movement. Specifically, we use the synthetic control method to study the economic consequences of the surprising victory of the Parti Québécois in Quebec in 1976 and the subsequent referendum on Quebec’s independence in 1980. We find that, relative to our control, the election of separatists had a small positive effect on economic activity until 1980 after which a small negative effect appears. We further find that the size of the provincial government (relative to GDP) constantly and significantly exceeded its synthetic control. We argue that the economic costs of separatism may arise from the frequently associated violence and not be intrinsic to any sort of political disintegration.
My paper on measurement errors of agricultural output in Lower Canada in 1851 and how it affects our evaluation of the effects of land tenure laws on farming productivity is now publicly available in Social Science Quarterly. The abstract is below:
This article argues that the 1851 census of Canada East (the modern‐day province of Quebec) requires a set of important corrections. Using corrections based on ethnic origin composition, I demonstrate how significantly wheat and oat yields were underestimated in Canada East. More importantly, I argue that the measurement errors are not randomly distributed and that they are biased against attempts to test the role of institutions. I show how the new method of correcting the data change our interpretation of agricultural efficiency in Lower Canada in the mid‐19th century. While this correction may seem minor, it shows that in the past, the data took a form that was biased against numerous hypotheses concerning land tenure institutions.
I have a new working paper (co-authored with Phil Magness) which has been submitted to Independent Review. In this short article, we explain a way to sort the wheat from the chaff with regards to social justice. We argue that relational equality (an idea at the center of the social justice literature) is a potent concept and that cementing relational inequality is a method of preserving rent-seeking arrangements that discriminate against particular groups (minorities or majorities). The paper is available here on SSRN and the abstract is below:
Social justice, as a concept, has long been considered inimical to the classical liberal tradition (Hayek 1976; Nozick 1973; 1974). To be fair, there is much to criticize about the concept. The definitional fluidity of the term, along with its frequent deployment for “activist” political endeavors, cast doubt upon the scholarly rigor of the term (Hayek 1978). However, where there is chaff, there is wheat and thus the possibility of salvaging some parts of the social justice concept to serve both normative and positive ends (Tomasi 2012, xvii-xx). Sorting the wheat from the chaff is the aim of this paper. To do so, we introduce the concept of “rent-seeking in narratives,” which, as we argue, takes the best concepts from the literature on social justice in order to make it a relevant tool for social science and classical liberal thought.
I have a new working paper available with Alexander Salter (Texas Tech University). This time, we tackle the topic of state capacity by asking the question of why we fail to observe persistent cases of societies with low state capacity and high levels of economic development. The paper is available on SSRN here, the abstract is below:
In this paper, we explore why there are no examples of societies with low state capacity and high economic development. We argue that such an outcome is unlikely because of the nature of investments in state capacity. Societies that become rich in the absence of a strong state invite predation by societies that develop such states. Thus societies invest in state capacity, in part, to plunder other societies’ wealth. Those investments are a form of rent-seeking. Potentially preyed-upon societies are forced to invest in state capacity in turn so as to deter potential attackers. This entails that as soon as a rent seeker enters the game, the likelihood of a low-capacity, high-development society surviving falls. This explains the historical lack of such societies. We thus interpret state capacity not as a causal condition for widespread economic prosperity, but a survivability condition for enjoying this prosperity.