New Working Paper: Uneven Gains from the First Wave of Right to Work Laws, 1944 to 1963

I have a new working paper with Justin Callais, Alicia Plemmons and Gary Wagner on the first wave of right to work laws in America (1944 to 1963) which banned closed shop union agreements. We find, unlike other works that deal with later adopters (post-1963), that right to work increased within-state inequality but also increased income per worker by between 4% and 7%. Since the states that adopted right to work laws were also poorer states that converged faster because of the laws, this probably mitigated (but not fully) the within-state increase in inequality (i.e., reduced cross-state inequality compensates for increased within-state inequality). The paper is here on SSRN and the abstract is below:

Since the 1940s, right-to-work (RTW) laws’ impact on income distribution has been debated, particularly due to the understudied early adopters from 1944 to 1963. Earlier studies overlooked these initial impacts, starting analysis with Louisiana in 1976. Our research employs a two-stage difference-indifferences approach, revealing that RTW laws increased the income share of the top 1%, raised average income per worker with no effects on other variables (labor force participation, labor share of income). These laws contributed to rising inequality within states, countering the trend towards income equality from the 1940s to the 1960s.

New Working Paper– Poverty Spells and Economic Freedom: Canadian Evidence

I have a new working paper out with James Dean (now of Western Carolina University). He and I previously collaborated on work regarding intra-generational income mobility and economic freedom in Canada since 1982. In this new working paper, we move on to the topic of poverty dynamics (i.e., transitions in and out of poverty) in Canada since 1992. The paper is here on SSRN and the abstract is below

Economic freedom is generally associated with higher average income levels. However, can the very poor benefit from it? Does it help them escape their disadvantaged position? Does it limits the possibility of entry into low-income status? In this paper, we use longitudinal data from Canada regarding the duration of low income spells, entries and exits from low-income status from 1992 to 2020 to deal with that question. Aggregated at the provincial level, these different indicators of low-income status are negatively related with the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of North America (EFNA) index.

This paper is the second of a series of a number of planned articles on the matter of mobility and markets using Canadian provincial data.

Government policies creating inequality between ♂ and ♀

Parental

Look at this graph, look at it closely. What does it say? Where government programs create parental leaves program paid for by employers, the wage gap between women and men in their early thirties is greater and the longer the duration of these payments, the greater the gap grows. How does this hold econometrically? Relatively well.

Longer maternity leaves in Germany have lasting effects on the long-term earnings of women. However, the expansion of maternity leave programs did not have any lasting negative effects on the long-term supply of labour of female. In short, women were incited by government policy to stay longer off the market which had a detrimental effect on long-term wages. This seems to hold across Europe as a whole (here).

But more simply, it creates inequality. That government program incentivizes families to reduce the time spent at work at the expense of future earnings. Whilst as a society, we might value the presence of mothers at home (and hence value maternity leave programs) but we have to understand that this comes at a cost : higher inequality between male and female.  This is the case because longer periods spent off the market have a large effect on the wage gap. As the OECD recently explained in a 2013 paper :

However, if employees take up very long leave entitlements, they may become detached from the labour market as their skills depreciate. They might also have trouble getting the same job back.1 Moreover, the extent to which leave mandates produce positive outcomes for women also depends on how employers respond. Some may be reluctant to hire women, whom they perceive as more likely to take leave, if similarly qualified male workers are available. They may also seek to keep women in jobs where time off has a limited impact on the production process or where it is relatively easy to replace them. Plainly, however, the different perspectives on the labour market outcomes of paid leave mandates make it difficult to draw conclusions with any certainty as to the overall effect.

This conclusion would hold even if the policies were “equalized” to incite men to stay at home in equal proportions to women because the wage gap between men would grow (logically, unless men across the income distribution chose to stay at home in proportions representative of their income – something I find unlikely) . If governments want to have policies that will increase the incentives to have kids – programs like parental leave – they must understand that the counter-effect is that they end up generating inequalities that they will condemn. You may want that policy – I don’t think it’s a terrible policy (in principle) – but you can’t complain about the results you knew you were going to get.

When I scream out my lungs that governments are much better at creating inequalities (that they will then condemn) than they are at reducing them, this is a good example.

H/T : Francis Pouliot