Working paper: Why nationalize the production of public goods?

I have a new working paper out. It proposes a price theory-based explanation of why states nationalize the production of “public goods” (i.e., non-excludable and non-rivalrous). This is different than existing explanations as the theory ignores whether private provision is efficient or superior to public provision. I call it the “redistributive engine” theory whereby the state nationalizes because it can extract rents that are redistributed to its agents and key interest groups. The theory also allows for nationalization to be welfare-enhancing but — unlike previous theories — it is not a necessary condition (nor is it a sufficient one). I apply it to the case of the federalization of lighthouses in the American Republic from 1789 to 1815. The paper is here on SSRN and the abstract is below:

If private provision of public goods is both feasible and optimal, why do states intervene and assume their provision? This question parallels the broader inquiry of whether state provision can be explained without resorting to public interest justifications or suboptimal private provision. We answer that states take over the provision of public goods from the private sector depending on the political rents that can be secured in other markets (i.e., those that are not that of the public goods)—even if they potentially reduce economic activity. We call this the “redistributive engine” motivation, and it allows us to be agnostic about both the quality of private provision and the net outcome of public takeover. It is a price-theoretic justification only. Using the case of American lighthouses in the Early Republic (1789 to 1815) as illustration, we demonstrate that federal control of lighthouses was part of a rent-seeking arrangement that introduced subtle but significant protectionist measures for the domestic shipping industry and a broader hidden tariff (which is often unmeasured by economic historians). In the process, federal oversight of lighthouses provided a mechanism for patronage distribution, facilitating coalition-building and political consolidation. Ergo, a redistributive engine whose net effect is unclear.

New Working Paper: Uneven Gains from the First Wave of Right to Work Laws, 1944 to 1963

I have a new working paper with Justin Callais, Alicia Plemmons and Gary Wagner on the first wave of right to work laws in America (1944 to 1963) which banned closed shop union agreements. We find, unlike other works that deal with later adopters (post-1963), that right to work increased within-state inequality but also increased income per worker by between 4% and 7%. Since the states that adopted right to work laws were also poorer states that converged faster because of the laws, this probably mitigated (but not fully) the within-state increase in inequality (i.e., reduced cross-state inequality compensates for increased within-state inequality). The paper is here on SSRN and the abstract is below:

Since the 1940s, right-to-work (RTW) laws’ impact on income distribution has been debated, particularly due to the understudied early adopters from 1944 to 1963. Earlier studies overlooked these initial impacts, starting analysis with Louisiana in 1976. Our research employs a two-stage difference-indifferences approach, revealing that RTW laws increased the income share of the top 1%, raised average income per worker with no effects on other variables (labor force participation, labor share of income). These laws contributed to rising inequality within states, countering the trend towards income equality from the 1940s to the 1960s.